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ABSTRACT
A model of capacity choice and utilization is developed
consistent with value maximization when investment is irreversible
and future demand is uncertain. Investment requires the full
value of a marginal unit of capacity to be at least as large as
its full cost. The former includes the value of the firm's option
not to utilize the unit, and the latter includes the opportunity
cost of exercising the investment option. We show that for
moderate amounts of uncertainty, the firm's optimal capacity is
much smaller than it would be if investment were reversible, and a
large fraction of the firm's value is due to the possibility of
future growth. We also characterize the behavior of capacity and
capacity utilization, and discuss'implications for the measurement
of marginal cost and Tobin's q.
1. Introduction.
When investment is irreversible and future demand conditions are
uncertain, a firm's investment expenditure involves the exercising, or
"killing," of an option (the option to productively invest). One gives up
the option of waiting for new information (about evolving demand and cost
conditions), and using that information to re-evaluate the desirability
and/or timing of the expenditure. This lost option value must be included
as part of the cost of the investment. As a result, the standard investment
rule "Invest when the marginal value of a unit of capital is at least as
large as the purchase and installation cost of the unit" is not valid.
Instead the marginal value of the unit must exceed the purchase and
installation cost by an amount equal to the value of keeping the firm's
option to invest alive -- an opportunity cost of investing.
This aspect of investment has been explored in an emerging literature,
and most notably in the recent paper by McDonald and Siegel (1986). They
show that with even moderate levels of uncertainty, the value of this
opportunity cost can be large, and an investment rule that ignores it will
be grossly in error. Their calculations, and those in the related papers by
Brennan and Schwartz (1985) and Maid and Pindyck (1985), show that in many
cases projects should be undertaken only when their present value is at
least double their direct cost.'
The existing literature has been concerned with investment decisions
involving discrete projects, e.g. whether to build a factory. This paper
examines the implications of irreversibility for capacity choice, e.g. how
large a factory to build. In particular I focus on the marginal investment
decision. This provides a simple and intuitively appealing solution to the
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optimal capacity problem, as well as insight into the sources and evolution
of the firm's value. In addition, it clarifies issues related to the
measurement of long-run marginal cost, and the interpretation and measure-
ment of Tobin's q.
A firm's capacity choice is optimal when the value of the marginal
unit of capacity is just equal to the total cost of that unit. This total
cost includes the purchase and installation cost, plus the opportunity cost
of exercising the option to buy the unit. An analysis of capacity choice
therefore involves two steps. First, the value of a marginal unit of
capacity must be determined, given that the firm already has capacity K.
To do this we must account for the fact that if demand unexpectedly falls,
the unit of capacity may be unutilized. Second, the value of the option to
invest in the marginal unit must be determined (it will depend in part on
the value of the marginal unit itself), together with the decision rule for
exercising the option. In essence, this decision rule is the solution to
the optimal capacity problem.
Because a marginal unit of capacity need not be utilized, it is worth
more when demand fluctuates stochastically. This might suggest that the
firm should hold more capacity when future demand is uncertain, but in fact
the opposite is true. The reason is that uncertainty also increases the
opportunity cost of exercising the option to invest in a marginal unit.
Although the value of the marginal unit increases, this opportunity cost
increases even more, so the net effect is to reduce the firm's optimal
capacity. 2 Indeed, for many product markets the volatility of demand is
such that firms should hold far less capacity than standard investment
models would suggest.
This model of capacity choice also has implications for the valuation
of firms. The value of a firm has two components: the value of installed
capacity, and the value of the firm's options to install more capacity in
the future. Solutions of the model based on plausible parameter values
suggest that for typical firms, "growth options" should account for more
that half (and in some cases much more than half) of market value.
This paper, like others cited above, stresses the options that firms
have to productively invest. These options are important assets of firms.
Firms hold them even if they are price-takers in product and input markets,
and they can account for a good fraction of their market value. What gives
firms these options? It may be a patent on a particular production techno-
logy, or ownership of land or natural resource reserves. But more general-
ly, a firm's managerial resources and expertise, reputation, market posi-
tion, and possibly scale, all of which may have been built up over time,
enable it to productively undertake investments that individuals or other
firms cannot undertake.3
The next section lays out a simple model of capacity choice with
irreversible investment, based on the assumption that firms maximize their
market value. It differs from previous models of this type, e.g. Brennan
and Schwartz (1985) and McDonald and Siegel (1986), in that the focus is on
the marginal investment decision, rather than the decision to invest in a
discrete project. As the model is developed, a numerical example is used to
show how the marginal value of capital, the opportunity cost of investing,
and the firm's optimal capacity depend on current demand and uncetainty over
future demand. Remaining sections of the paper use the model to study the
value of the firm, the behavior of capacity and capacity utilization over
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time, and implications for the measurement of marginal cost and Tobin's q.
2. A Model of Capacity Choice.
Consider the investment decisions of a firm that might have monopoly
power, and faces the following demand function: 4
P = 8(t) - Q (1)
(The firm might be a price-taker, in which case = 0.) Here 8(t) evolves
over time according to the following stochastic process:
d = 8dt + dz (2)
where dz is the increment of a Weiner process, i.e. dz = (t)(dt)1 '2 , with
s(t) a serially uncorrelated and normally distributed random variable.
Eqn. (2) says that the current value of (and thus the current demand
function) is known to the firm, but future values of 8 are unknown, and are
lognormally distributed with a variance that grows with the time horizon.
Thus even though information arrives over time (the firm observes 8
changing), future demand is always uncertain, as is the case in most
real-world markets.5
Denote by Q*e the correlation of 8 with -the market portfolio. Now
suppose some asset or portfolio of assets exists with a stochastic return
perfectly correlated with 8, so that if x is the price of this asset, it
evolves according to:
dx = xdt + xdz
By the CAPM, the expected return on this asset must be = r + fe.ma, where
% is the market price of risk. We will assume that , the expected percen-
tage rate of change of 8, is less than p. (It will become clear later
that if this were not the case, no firm in the industry would ever install
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any capacity. No matter what the current level of , firms would always be
better off waiting and simply holding the option to install capacity in the
future.) Denote the difference between and c by 8, i.e. = - .-
The firm's problem is to determine, initially and over time, its
optimal investment spending on new production capacity. I assume that the
firm starts with no capacity, so that at t = 0 it decides how much initial
capacity to put in place. Later it may or may not add more capacity,
depending on how demand evolves.
For simplicity I assume that new capacity can be installed instantly,
and capital in place does not depreciate.' Another assumption -- and an
important one -- is that investment is irreversible. That is, although
capital in place can be sold by one firm to another, its scrap value is
small because it has no alternative use than that originally intended for
it. Thus a factory built to produce widgets can only be used to produce
widgets, so if the demand for widgets falls, its market value will fall.
The fact that investment is irreversible implies that there is an
opportunity cost associated with adding capacity -- adding capacity today
forecloses the possibility of adding it instead at some point in the future
(or never at all). Put another way, the firm currently has options to
install capacity at various points in the future (options that can be
exercised at the cost of purchasing the capital), and by installing capacity
now, it closes those options. The optimal rule is to invest until the value
of a marginal unit of capital is equal to its total cost -- the purchase and
installation cost, plus the value of the option on the unit.7
A few more details are needed to finish specifying the model: (i) each
unit of capital can be bought at a fixed price k per unit; (ii) each unit
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of capital in place provides the capacity to produce one unit of output per
time period; and (iii) the firm has an operating cost C(Q) = cQ +
(1/2)czQ2. In general c and/or 2 can be zero, but if Y = 0 (so the firm
is a price-taker), we require C2 > 0 to bound the firm's size.
For purposes of comparison, note that if future demand were certain
( = 0), and if a 0, the firm's optimal initial capital stock would be
K*(e) = (8 - c - rk)/(2Y+c 2 ), i.e. the firm should add capacity only if
8(K) > (2Y+c 2)K + c, + rk. We will see that with moderate amounts of
uncertainty over future demand, the optimal capital stock is considerably
smaller than this.
The Value of a Marginal Unit of Capacity.
To solve the firm's investment problem we first determine the value of
an incremental unit of capacity. That is, given that the firm already has
capacity K, we want to find the value to the firm of an incremental unit,
which we denote by V(K). (Note that V(K) is a function of as well as
K.) This is just the present value of the expected flow of incremental
profits from the marginal unit. Because the unit does not have to be
utilized, future incremental profits are a nonlinear function of 8, which is
stochastic. In particular, given a current capacity K, the incremental
profit at any future time t resulting from a marginal unit of capacity is:
7t (K) = max [0, (t - (2Y+c 2)K - c)] (3)
Thus AV(K) can be written as:
AV(K) = Sfr (K;8)f(8,t)dee- tdt (4)
oo t
where f(8,t) is the density function for at time t, p is the risk-adjusted
discount rate, and tt(K;O) is given by eqn. (3). It is difficult, however,
to evaluate (4) directly. In addition, the rate p might not be known.
Instead we obtain V(K) by solving the following equivalent problem:
What is the value of a factory that produces I unit of output per period,
with operating cost (2Y+c 2)K + c, where the output is sold in a perfectly
competitive market at a price t, and where the factory can be shut down
(temporarily and costlessly) if the price 8t falls below the operating
cost?@ It is shown in the Appendix that the solution to this problem is:
b.Ht; e < (2Y+c2)K + 
AV(K) = { (5)
b u2A + /8 - (2Y+c2)K + c/r > (2Y+c)K + c1
where: (r-& + [(r-6-o2 /2) 2 + 2r2 ] 1 /2 > 1
(r-- 2/ 2) 1 1( - - 1(r- 2/2) 2 + 2ra 2 1- < 0P2c 2CT2 02
: r - I-Pib -r -_ 21r8)_ (2Y+c 2)K + c1 1 > 01 r(p, - P2)
b = [- r) (2Y+c 2)K + c] - P2 > 02 r&(P - P2)
A numerical example is useful to illustrate the characteristics of
AV(K), as well as other aspects of the model. For this purpose I choose
r -& = .05, k = 10, c = 0, and either Y = .5 and c2 = 0, or equivalently
Y = 0 and C2 = 1.9 I vary 8 or K, and consider values of in the range of
0 to .4.10 For purposes of comparison, let AVo(K) denote AV(K) for = 0,
so bVo(K) = 8/8 - £(2Y+c 2)K + c]/r for > (2Y+c 2)K + cl, and 0 otherwise.
For our numerical example, Vo(K) = 20(8-K) for 8 K, and 0 otherwise.
Figure shows V(K) as a function of 8 for K = 1 and a = 0, .2, and
.4. Observe that V(K) looks like the value of a call option -- indeed it
is the sum of an infinite number of European call options (see Footnote 8).
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As with a call option, AV(K) is increasing with o, and for > 0,
AV(K) > Vo(K) because the firm need not utilize its capacity. As e8 m,
AV(K) Vo (K); for very large relative to K, this unit of capacity
will almost surely be continuously utilized over a long period of time.
Figure 2 shows V(K) as a function of K for 8 = 2, and = 0, .1, .2,
and .4. Because demand evolves stochastically, a marginal unit of capacity
has some positive value no matter how large is the existing capital stock;
there is always some chance that it will be utilized over any finite period
of time. The greater is , the more slowly V(K) declines with K. Also,
the smaller is K, the more likely it is that the marginal unit will be
utilized, and so the smaller is V(K) - Vo(K). When K = , V(O) = Vo(K);
with c = 0, the first marginal unit will always be utilized.
The fact that V(K) is larger when > 0 might suggest that the firm
should hold a larger amount of capacity, but just the opposite is true. As
shown below, the firm's opportunity cost of exercising its option to invest
in the marginal unit also becomes larger, and by an even greater amount.
The Decision to Invest in the Marginal Unit.
Having valued the marginal unit of capacity, we now value the firm's
option to invest in this unit, and the optimal decision rule for exercising
the option. This is analogous to a perpetual call option with exercise
price k, on a stock that pays a proportional dividend at rate and has a
current price V(K). In the Appendix it is shown that its value, F(K), is:
aAe5 8 < 8*(K)
tF(K) = (6)
AV(K) - k ; 8 > 0'(K)
where: a = 2b2(*)(P2-P) + 1(e*)(1-P1 > 0
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p1, p2, and b are given under eqn. (5) above, and e9*(K) is the critical
value of at or above which it is optimal to purchase the marginal unit of
capacity, i.e. the firm should purchase the unit if > 8*(K), This
critical value 8*(K) is in turn the solution to :
b2(a1-E2)(o*)2+ P 212 (2+C 2 )K + c1 k = 0 (7)
Pi 6p1 r
Eqn. (7) can be solved numerically for 8*, and eqn. (6) can then be used to
calculate F(K).
Recall our assumption that 6 > 0. The reader can verify that as &6 0,
8*(K) . Unless > 0, the opportunity cost of investing in a unit of
capacity always exceeds the benefit, and the firm will never install
capacity.' Thus if firms in an industry are investing optimally and some
positive amount of investment is taking place, we should observe > 0.
As with a call option on a dividend-paying stock, both F(K) and the
critical value ef(K) increase as increases. Figure 3 shows F(K) as a
function of for K = 1 and = 0, .2, and .4. When = 0, 8 = 1.5,
i.e. the firm should increase capacity only if exceeds 1.5. For = .2
and .4, 8* is 2.45 and 3.44 respectively. The opportunity cost of exercis-
ing the firm's option to invest in additional capacity is F(K), which
increases with , so a higher cf implies a higher critical value 8*(K).
Also,' it is easily shown that 8'(K) is monotonically increasing in K.
The Firm's Optimal Capacity.
The function 8*(K) is the firm's optimal investment rule; if and K
are such that > (K), the firm should add capacity, increasing K until 
rises to . Equivalently we can substitute for b2(K) and rewrite eqn. (7)
in terms of K*(8), the firm's optimal capacity:
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E:L,r-8)p9[(2Y+c 2)K* + c l-p2 _ [2X+c2)K* + cl + Le - k = 0 (7')rsp 1 r 
Figure 4 shows K*(8) for = 0, .2 and .4. (For many industries .2 is
a conservative value for -- see Footnote 10.) Observe that K is much
smaller when future demand is uncertain. For = .4, 8 must be more than
three times as large as when = 0 before any capacity is installed.
Another way to see how uncertainty over future demand affects the
firm's optimal capacity is by comparing AF(K), the value of the option to
invest in a marginal unit, with V(K) - k, the net (of purchase cost) value
of the unit. The optimal capacity K*(8) is the maximum K for which these
two quantities are equal. Note from eqn. (6) that for 8 > 8', or equiva-
lently, K < K*, exercising the option to invest maximizes its value, so that
F(K) = V(K) - k, but for K > K, F( > V(K) - k, and the option to
invest is worth more "alive" than "dead."
This is shown in Figure 5, which plots F(K) and V(K) - k as functions
of K, for 8 = 2 and = .2. Recall that V(K) is larger when future demand
is uncertain. As the figure shows, if the opportunity cost of exercising
the option to invest were ignored (i.e. the firm added capacity until bV(K)
- k was zero), the firm's capacity would be about 2.3 units, as opposed to
1.5 units when = O. But at these capacity levels the opportunity cost of
investing in a marginal unit exceeds the net value of the unit, so the
value of the firm is not maximized. The optimal capacity is only K = .67,
the largest K for which F(K) = V(K) - k, and the solution to eqn. (7).
3. The Value of The Firm.
As noted above, K*(8) is the capacity level which maximizes the firm's
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market value, net of cash outlays for the purchase of capital. This can be
seen algebraically and from Figure 5 by noting that the value of the firm
has two components, the value of installed capacity, and the value-of the
firm's options to install more capacity in the future. The firm's net
value as a function of its capacity K is thus given by:
K
Net Value = SbV(v)dv + F(v)dv - kK (8)
o K
Differentiating with respect to K shows that this is maximized when K = K*
such that V(K*) - F(K*) - k = 0.
The value of the firm's installed capacity, V(K*), is just the first
integral in eqn. (8). In Figure 5 it is the area under the curve V(K) - k
from K 0 to K*, plus the purchase cost kK*. The value of the firm's
options to expand is the second integral, which in Figure 5 is the area
under the curve F(K) from K = K to . As the figure suggests, the value
of the firm's growth options is a large portion of its total value.
The sensitivity of firm value and its components to uncertainty over
future demand can be seen from Table 1, which shows K*, V(K*), F(K), and
total value for different values of and . When a = 0, the value of the
firm is only the value of its installed capacity. Whatever the value of
0, the firm is worth more the the more volatile is demand. A larger a
implies a larger value for each unit of installed capacity, and a much
larger value for the firm's options to expand. Also, the larger is a, the
larger is the fraction of firm value attributable to its growth options.
When = .2 or more, more than half of the firm's value is F(K*), the value
of its growth options. Even when = .1, F(K*) accounts for more than half
of total value when is 1 or less. (When demand is currently small, it is
the possibility of greater
its value.) And there is
demand
always
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4. The Dynamics of Capacity, Capacity Utilization, and Firm Value.
If the firm begins with no capacity, it initially observes 8 and
installs a starting capacity K*(8). If 8 then increases, it will expand
capacity accordingly, and the value of the firm will rise. The value of its
growth options will also rise, but will become a smaller fraction of total
value (see Table 1). However if 8 decreases, it will find itself holding
more capacity than it would have chosen had the decrease been anticipated.
The firm's value will fall, and depending on how much 8 decreases, some of
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its capacity may become unutilized.
Because capital does not depreciate in this model, the firm's capacity
is non-decreasing, but will rise only periodically. The dynamics of
capacity are characterized in Figure 6, which shows a sample path for (t),
and the corresponding behavior of K(t). (The duration of continuous upward
movements in K(t) is exaggerated.) The firm begins at to by installing
K*(8 o) K. Then 8 increases until it reaches a (temporary) maximum 8 at
t,, and K is increased accordingly to K. Here it remains fixed until t,
when 8 again reaches 81. Afterwards K is increased as 8 increases, until t3
when begins to decline from a new maximum, and K remains fixed at K.
Thus an implication of the model is that investment occurs only in
spurts, when demand is rising, and only when it is rising above historic
levels.1 2 Firms usually increase capacity only periodically, and this is
often attributed to the "lumpiness" of investment. But lumpiness is clearly
not required for this behavior.
Let us now examine the firm's capacity utilization. Clearly during
periods of expansion, all capacity will be utilized. When demand falls,
however, some capacity may go unutilized, but only if it falls far enough.
If the firm had unlimited capacity it would maximize current profits by
setting output at Q* = (8-cj)/(2Y+c2). However K*(8) (8-c)/(2Y+c2), and
as shown in Section 2, can be much less even for moderate values of . Thus
for 8 in the range (K) (2X+c2)K + c 8 < 8'(K), capacity will remain
fixed but will be fully utilized. Capacity will go unutilized only when 8 (
8(K). In Figure 6 this occurs during the intervals (t., tb) and (to, t).
The irreversibility of investment induces firms to hold less capacity
as a buffer against unanticipated drops in demand. As a result there will
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be periods of low demands when capacity is fully utilized. A large drop in
demand is required for capacity utilization to fall below 100%.
The value of the firm will move in the same direction as . Most of
the time the firm's capacity K will be above K*(8) -- in Figure 6 exceptions
are during the intervals (to, t) and (t2, t3) -- but given 8 and K, the
firm's value can always be computed from:
K
Value = lV(v;O)dv + F(v;9)dv (9)
o K
The share of the firm's value due to its growth options will also fluctuate
with 8. For example as Table 1 shows, during periods when capacity is
growing (so that K = K*(8)), this share falls. It also falls when is
falling and K > K(8). Thus as firms in this model evolve over time, growth
options tend to account for a smaller share of value.
5. The Measurement of Long-Run Marginal Cost.
The measurement of long-run marginal cost and its relationship to price
can be important for industry analyses in general, and antitrust applica-
tions in particular. As shown below, when investment is irreversible,
traditional measures will understate marginal cost and overstate the amount
by which it differs from price, even in a competitive market. This problem
is particularly severe when product markets are volatile.
Suppose = 0. Then F(K) = 0, and the firm sets K (and 0) so that:
,V(K) 8/ - [(2+c 2 )K + cI/r = k (10)
Note that V(K), the value of a marginal unit of capacity, is net of
(capitalized) marginal operating cost. Let us rewrite (10) as follows:
8/8 - 2K/r = (c + c2K)/r + k (10')
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The left-hand side of (10') is capitalized marginal revenue ( is capital-
ized at a rate because t is growing at rate c; with = 0, 8 = r - ).
The rght-hand side is full marginal cost, the capitalized operating cost,
plus the purchase cost of a unit of capital. Eqn. (10') is the usual
relation between marginal revenue and marginal cost when the former is
increasing at a deterministic rate.
Now suppose > 0, and K = K*(e). Then from eqn. (5), the optimality
condition V(K) = k + F(K) can be written as:
dV(K) = b28p2 + /8 - (2Y+c2)K + c/r = k + F(K) (11)
or: 8/ - 2YK/r - b29z2 + (C2K + c)/r + k + F(K) (11')
Observe that two adjustments must be made to obtain full (capitalized)
marginal cost, the RHS of (11'). The first term on the RHS of (11') is the
value of the firm's option to let the marginal unit of capacity go unutil-
ized, and must be subtracted from capitilized operating cost. The last term
is the opportunity cost of exercising the option to invest. As we have seen
in Section 2, the last term dominates the first, so that K must be smaller
to satisfy (1'), and marginal cost as conventionally measured will under-
state true marginal cost.
If the firm is a price-taker, Y = 0 and P = 8. Price will equal
marginal cost, if the latter is defined correctly as in (11'). Unfortunate-
ly the first and last terms on the RHS of (11') are difficult to measure,
particularly with aggregate data. But if one wishes to compare price with
marginal cost, ignoring them can be misleading.'s
6. Marginal q and Investment.
The q theory of investment says that firms have an incentive to invest
whenever marginal q -- the i
marginal unit of capital divided
But models based on this theory
investment." There may be sever
that in such models the cost
includes only the purchase and in
grossly understate the true cost
In empirical applications
market value from a marginal unit
expected profit flow from the u
our notation, q = V(K)/k. But
clearly q > 1 does not impl
measure for q is found by noting
capital increases the value of
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ncrease in market value resulting from a
by the cost of that unit -- exceeds one.
have not been very successful in explaining
al reasons for this, but one possibility is
of a marginal unit of capital typically
stallation cost. As we have seen, this can
of the unit.
(e.g. Abel and Blanchard), the change in
of capital is measured as the NPV of the
nit, i.e. the present value of the unit. In
this ignores the opportunity cost F(K);
y that K should be increased. The correct
that the addition of a marginal unit of
the firm's capital in place by V(K), but
decreases the value of the firm's growth options by F(K). The net change
in market value is thus V(K) - F(K), so the correct measure for q is:
q = [8V(K) - F(K)]/k (11)
Setting q = 1 yields the optimal K*.
It is easy to see why marginal q as it is usually measured may fail to
explain investment. Note that an increase in demand (i.e. in 8) will
increase V(K), but it will also increase F(K), although by a smaller
amount. And if increases, both F(K) and V(K) rise, but V(K) by less,
so that the desired capital stock falls. But the market value of the firm
increases, so that even if market value data is used to measure q, we will
see an increase in q but a decrease in investment.
As mentioned earlier, F(K) is unfortunately difficult to measure. But
_11^__1_
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in some cases it may be possible to construct a proxy for F(K) based on the
sample variance of demand fluctuations. The use of such a proxy might
improve the explanatory power of q theory models.
7. Conclusions.
The model presented here is a simple one that ignores complications
such as adjustment costs,
tures. It can easily be
numerical methods may then
numerical methods are used,
ized. For example, demand
follow some alternative sto
By treating capital in
on the marginal investment
sibility of investment and
delivery lags, and lumpiness of capital expendi-
extended to account for these factors, but
be required to obtain solutions. Of course once
other aspects of the model can also be general-
can be a nonlinear function of 9, or could
chastic process, perhaps including jumps.
place as homogeneous, we have been able to focus
decision, and clarify the ways in which irrever-
uncertainty over future demand affect both the
value and cost of a marginal unit of capacity. Besides yielding a relative-
ly simple solution to the problem of capacity choice, the model provides a
straightforward method for calculating the firm's market value and its
components. It also provides insight into the measurement of long-run
marginal cost, and Tobin's q.
In many markets output prices fluctuate with annual standard deviations
in excess of 20 percent. Our results show that in such markets, firms
should hold much less capacity than would be the case if investment were
reversible or future demand were known with certainty. Also, much of the
market value of these firms is due to the possibility (as opposed to the
expectation) of stronger demands in the future. This value may result from
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patents and technical knowledge, but it also arises from the managerial
expertise and infrastructure, and market position that gives these firms (as
opposed to potential entrants) the option to economically expand capacity.
One might ask whether firms correctly compute and take into account the
opportunity cost of investing when making capacity expansion decisions.
Ignoring such costs would lead to overinvestment. McConnell and Muscarella
(1986) have found that for manufacturing firms, market value tends to
increase (decrease) when managers announce an increase (decrease) in planned
investment expenditures, which is inconsistent with a systematic tendency to
overinvest.1 5 But there is anecdotal evidence that managers often base
investment decisions on present values computed with discount rates that far
exceed those that would be implied by the CAPM -- diversifiable and non-
diversifiable risk are sometimes confused, and an arbitrary "risk factor" is
often added to the discount rate. It may be, then, that managers use the
wrong method to get close to the right answer.
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APPENDIX
Here we derive eqn. (5) for V(K;8) and eqns. (6) and (7) for the
optimal investment rule and value of the investment option F(K;8). -
The value of a marginal unit of capacity, V(K;8), is found by valuing
an equivalent "incremental project" that produces I unit of output per
period at cost (2Y+c 2) + c, which is sold at price 8(t), and where the firm
can (temporarily and costlessly) shut down if price falls below cost. To
value this, create a portfolio that is long the project and short VO units
of the output, or equivalently the asset or portfolio of assets perfectly
correlated with . Because the expected rate of growth of 8 is only = -
8, the short position requires a payment of 88ObV per unit of time (or no
rational investor would hold the corresponding long position). The value of
this portfolio is i = AV - AVe, and its instantaneous return is:
d(AV) - Vsd8 - &88V 8 + j[8 - (2Y+c 2)K - c] (A.1)
The last term in (.1) is the cash flow from the "incremental project;" j
is a switching variable: j = 1 if 8(t) (2Y+c 2)K + c, and O otherwise.
By Ito's Lemma, d(lV) = ede + (1/2)tVee(d9)2. Substitute eq. (2)
for d and observe that the return (A.1) is riskless. Setting that return
equal to r = rV - rVoe yields the following equation for V:
8 292 Ve8 + (r-s8)ev + j - (2Y+c 2)K - c - rV = (A.2)
The solution must satisfy the following boundary conditions:
AV(8=0) = 0
lim V =a 8/8 - (2Y +cz) + c/r
Or
lim AVe = 1/6
and V and ave continuous at the switch point 8 = (2Y+c 2)K + c. The reader
can verify that (5) is the solution to (A.2) and its boundary conditions.
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Eqn. (A.2) can also be obtained by dynamic programming. Consider the
optimal operating policy ( = 0 or 1) that maximizes the value of the
above portfolio. The Bellman equation is:
rE = max {jfe - (21+c 2) - c - BV e + --E d} (A.3)J-(0,1) dt t
i.e. the competitive return r has two components, the cash flow given by
the first two terms in the maximand, and the expected rate of capital gain.
Expanding d = dV - EVode and substituting into (A.3) gives (A.2).
Finally, note that V must be the solution to (A.2) and the boundary
conditions even if the unit of capacity (the "incremental project") did not
exist, and could not be included in a hedge portfolio. All that is required
is an asset or portfolio of assets (x) that replicates the stochastic
dynamics of 8. As Merton (1977) has shown, one can replicate the value
function with a portfolio consisting only of the asset x and risk-free
bonds, and since the value of this portfolio will have the same dynamics as
AV, the solution to (A.2), V must be the value function to avoid dominance.
Eqn. (6) for F(K;O) can be derived in the same way. Using the same
arguments as above, it is easily shown that F must satisfy the equation:
'2AFee + (r-S)eAF - rF = 0 (A.4)
with boundary conditions:
AF(8=0) = 0
6F(e=e*) = V(e=8*) - k
AFe(8=e*) = Ave(=e*)
where 8* = *(K) is the exercise point, and V(8*) - k is the net gain from
exercising. The reader can verify that eqns. (6) and (7) are the solution
to (A.4) and the associated boundary conditions.
___^_____
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TABLE 1: VALUE OF FIRM
(cL= c = O, Y = .5, r = = .05, k = 10)
0* e K* V(K*) F(K) VALUE
0 .5 0 0 0 0
1 0.5 7.5 0 7.5
2 1.5 37.5 0 37.5
3 3.5 87.5 0 87.5
4 3.5 157.5 0 157.5
.1 .5 0 0 0.4 0.4
1 0.23 4.3 3.4 7.7
2 1.00 33.1 9.1 42.2
3 1.82 80.4 20.3 100.7
4 2.65 147.3 35.5 182.8
.2 .5 0 0 3.1 3.1
1 0.04 0.8 13.5 14.3
2 0.67 24.0 49.2 73.2
3 1.37 67.1 94.6 161.7
4 2.09 134.1 143.7 277.8
.4 .5 0 0 25.8 25.8
1 0 0 69.7 69.7
2 0.-15 5.9 182.6 188.7
3 0.64 36.2 307.2 343.4
4 1.22 91.3 427.5 518.8
___^__11__1_1__1_·_I___----.-.
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FOOTNOTES
1. Other examples of this literature include the papers by Bernanke
(1983), Cukierman (1980), Baldwin (1982), and Paddock, Siegel, and
Smith (1984). In the papers by Bernanke and Cukierman, uncertainty
over future market conditions is reduced as time passes, so firms have
an incentive to delay investing when markets are volatile (e.g. during
recessions). In the other papers cited above and in the model I
present here, future market conditions are always uncertain. But
because access to the investment opportunity is analogous to holding a
call option on a dividend-paying stock, for any positive amount of
risk, an expenditure should be made only when the value of the result-
ing project exceeds its cost by a positive amount, and increased
uncertainty will increase the incentive to delay the investment
expenditure. Thus the results are similar to those in Bernanke
and Cukierman, but for different reasons.
2. In Abel (1983) and Hartman (1972) uncertainty over future prices leads
to an increase in the firm's optimal capital stock when the production
function is linear homogeneous and there are convex adjustment costs.
The reason is that the marginal revenue product of capital is a convex
function of price, so that as in our model, a marginal unit of capital
is worth more when price is stochastic. However in Abel and Hartman,
investment is reversible, so that no options are closed when the firm
invests, and the opportunity cost of investing is zero.
3. A complete model of industry evolution would also describe the competi-
tive processes through which firms obtain these options. Such a model
is beyond the scope of this paper.
4. Analytic solutions for this model can be obtained for any demand
function linear in 8, i.e. P = 8(t) + f(Q). I use (1) for simplicity.
5. It is straightforward to also allow for uncertainty over future
operating cost. The qualitative results would be the same.
6. Relaxing these assumptions makes no qualitative difference in the
results. In fact, allowing for lead times in the construction and
installation of new capacity will magnify the effects of uncertainty.
For a related model that looks specifically at the effects of lead
times, see Maid and Pindyck (1985).
7. Still another way to see this is to note that the NPV of investing in a
marginal unit of capital might be positive because of possible future
states of nature that are profitable. But that NPV might be made even
larger by investing at a later date (and discounting the cost).
8. The valuation of a factory that can be temporarily shut down has been
studied by Brennan and Schwartz (1985) and McDonald and Siegel (1985).
Observe from eqn. (3) that the present value of an incremental profit
at future time t is the value of a European call option, with expira-
tion date t and exercise price (2Y+c2)K + c, on a stock whose price is
_ ____ ____I_·_ ____________
8, paying a proportional dividend . This point was made by McDonald
and Siegel (1985). Thus V(K), the value of our "equivalent factory,"
can be found by summing the values of these call options for every
future t. However this does not readily yield a closed form solution,
and I use an approach similar to that of Brennan and Schwartz (1985).
9. With r and equal, (c = 0 if stochastic changes in 8 are completely
diversifiable (i.e. Qe = 0 so p = r), but :> 0 otherwise. Also, as
can be seen from eqn. (5), (Y=0, c2 =1) and (=.5, c2=0) give the
same marginal value of capital, and the same optimal behavior of the
firm. In the first case the firm is a price-taker but earns infra-
marginal rent, and in the second case it has monopoly power.
10. The standard deviations of annual changes in the prices of such
commodities as oil, natural gas, copper, and aluminum are in the range
of 20 to 50 percent. For manufactured goods these numbers are somewhat
lower, but often 20 percent or higher. Thus a value of of .2 could
be considered "typical" for simulation purposes.
11. If = 0, AV(K) has an expected rate of growth equal to the risk-
adjusted market rate. Since the firm's option to invest is perpetual,
there would be no gain from installing capacity now rather than later.
12. If we allow for depreciation, investment will occur more frequently and
even when demand is somewhat below historic highs, but it will still
occur in spurts.
13. Hall (1986) reports that price significantly exceeds marginal cost for
most two-digit industries, and finds no explanation for this disparity
consistent with competition. Hall's test of marginal cost pricing is
based on the relation between the marginal product of labor and the
product wage. If firms set marginal operating cost equal to a
(constant) proportion of price, his technique will apply, whatever the
capital stock. But as shown in Section 4, there can be a wide range of
prices for which the firm is capacity constrained, and the ratio of
marginal operating cost to price will vary with price.
14. For example, the model developed by Abel and Blanchard (1986) is one of
the most sophisticated attempts to explain investment in a q theory
framework; it uses a carefully constructed measure for marginal rather
than average q, incorporates delivery lags and costs of adjustment, and
explicitly measures expectations of future values of explanatory
variables. But Abel and Blanchard conclude that "our data are not
sympathetic to the basic restrictions imposed by the q theory, even
extended to allow for simple delivery lags." Also, see Summers (1981).
15. But they find the opposite true for firms in the oil industry, where
there may be a tendency to overinvest in exploration and development.
I _L__
- 23 -
REFERENCES
Abel, Andrew B., "Optimal Investment under Uncertainty," American Economic
Review, March 1983, 83, 228-33.
Abel, Andrew B., and Olivier J. Blanchard, "The Present Value of Profits and
Cyclical Movements in Investment," Econometrica, March 1986. -
Baldwin, Carliss Y., "Optimal Sequential Investment when Capital is Not
Readily Reversible," Journal of Finance, 1982, 37, 763-82.
Bernanke, Ben S., "Irreversibility, Uncertainty, and Cyclical Investment,"
Quarterly Journal of Economics, February 1983, 98, 85-106.
Brennan, Michael J., and Eduardo S. Schwartz, "Evaluating Natural Resource.
Investments," Journal of Business, January 1985, 58, 135-157.
Cukierman, Alex, "The Effects of Uncertainty on Investment under Risk
Neutrality with Endogenous Information," Journal of Political Economy,
June 1980, 88, 462-475.
Hall, Robert E., "The Relation Between Price and Marginal Cost in U.S.
Industry," NBER Working Paper No. 1785, January 1986.
Hartman, Richard, "The Effects of Price and Cost Uncertainty on Investment,"
Journal of Economic Theory, October 1972, 5, 258-66.
Kester, W. Carl, "Today's Options for Tomorrow's Growth," Harvard Business
Review, March/April 1984, 153-160.
Maid, Saman, and Robert S. Pindyck, "Time to Build, Option Value, and
Investment Decisions," NBER Working Paper No. 1654, June 1985.
McConnell, John J., and Chris J. Muscarella, "Corporate Capital Expenditure
Decisions and the Market Value of the Firm," Journal of Financial
Economics, forthcoming, 1986.
McDonald, Robert, and Daniel R. Siegel, "Investment and the Valuation of
Firms When There is an Option to Shut Down," International Economic
Review, October 1985.
McDonald, Robert, and Daniel R. Siegel, "The Value of Waiting to Invest,"
Quarterly Journal of Economics, forthcoming, 1986.
Merton, Robert C., "On the Pricing of Contingent Claims and the Modigliani
Miller Theorem," Journal of Financial Economics, 1977, 5, 241-49.
Paddock, James L., Daniel R. Siegel, and James L. Smith, "Option Valuation
of Claims on Physical Assets: The Case of Offshore Petroleum Leases,"
MIT Energy Laboratory Working Paper, November 1984, to appear in the
Quarterly Journal of Economics.
Summers, Lawrence H., "Taxation and Corporate Investment: A q-Theory
Approach," Brookinqs Papers on Economic Activity, 1981-1, 67-127.
(K = 1)
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5
THETA
MARGINiAL VVALUE OF INSTALLED CAPACITY
( = 2)
40
35
5
0
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5
K
50
45
40
z
-j
z
I'
2
LI
w
--
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
FIGURE 2:
3
-
z
-
C.0
-J
30
25
20
15
10
FIG URE 1: VAUE F MRGINAL UNIT OF CAPACITY
FIGURE a3: VALUE OF OPTION TO INVEST IN MARGINAL UNIT OF CAFPCITY
(K = 1; + INDICATES *(K=I); FOR 8 > , F(K) = V(K) - k)
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4
THETA
FIGURE 4: OPTIMAL CAPACITY K*(t)
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5
THETA
._
I-
I J
Z
z0
p-2O0I.O
O
>
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
4
3.5
3
2.5
I 2
1.5
1
0.5
0
-- - --
--·- "-- II"-"-`--------
.*
OPTIMAL CAPACITY, NET VALUE OF MARGINAL UNIT OF INSTALLED
CAPACITY, AND VALUE OF OPTION TO INVEST IN MARGINAL UNIT
(8 = 2)
30
25
20
15
10
5
0 0.5 K 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4
K
GURE 6: BEHAVIOR OF CAPACITY AND CAPACITY UTILIZATION
I
I I
II~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ I I
I t II ] 
'. ~I 
t. t3 tc
z
0
.
0
z
-C
-J
I'-
,.
U
L.
0
,(
I
-.
-5
FI
A
't 0o tl
-- '-- -
_ _
,xll------.----1I.---------------
FIGURE 5:
I1 L 
